The first in our series of articles highlighting various aspects of Olympic Games to celebrate the countdown to 2012 this article considers how the development over the last 40 years of anti-terrorism measures has resulted in Olympic Games that have been held without terrorist attacks aimed at political change. Since the disaster of the 1972 Munich Olympic Games where 11 Israeli athletes were killed by Palestinian gunmen, the world has been alerted to the importance of Olympic security; since then, the Olympic Games have become the standard-bearer for national organization and international cooperation on anti-terrorism within society generally.
However it is argued here that the investment in security and policing can prove counterproductive as a defensive antiterrorist strategy, for several reasons. First, rather than creating the feeling of a safe environment, it can lead to a climate of fear among the people to be protected. Second, it can lead to an exaggerated focus on one specific arrangement (the Olympic Games), with a parallel under-focus on other possible targets: terrorists can stay away from the Olympics and concentrate on other unprotected or under-focused targets. The author suggests that we are approaching an Olympic Stress Syndrome in the field of Olympic anti-terrorism measures and points out that we can never be too secure, but we can spend too much on security. The future will show if the increasing focus on security does result in a fortification of the Olympics and in a prohibitively expensive Games.
In this article I argue that the development of measures against terrorism at the Olympics from the Munich Games in 1972 until today the development of measures against terrorism at the Olympics from the Munich Games in 1972 until today has fostered the development of measures against terrorism at the Olympics from the Munich Games in 1972 until todayyuiop-=-gf===.[[ Also I argue that the security organization of the Olympics at present is in a state of Olympic Stress Syndrome. Central to the future organizers of the Olympic Games will be the costs of securing such events, as well as the willingness of spectators and athletes to participate in a sporting event where there is an ever-increasing focus on security and terrorism. Perhaps this heightened focus on security will make the Olympics less interesting – not only for participants and organizers, but also for terrorists?
Selliaas, A. (2012). From Olympic massacre to the Olympic Stress Syndrome International Review for the Sociology of Sport DOI: 10.1177/1012690211433481